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MARITIME ATTACHMENT AND ARREST: FACING A
JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ATTACK
The body of substantive and procedural law governing the disposition
of maritime claims in the federal courts provides the mechanism for resolu-
tion of the unique problems arising out of international sea commerce. As
with any legal system, the components of admiralty law must be analyzed
in terms of changing notions of fair play and substantial justice. The fact
that a procedure afforded due process under an ancient legal system does
not mean that the same procedure provides adequate protection to persons
in a contemporary context.' Recent Supreme Court decisions have sub-
stantially altered traditional notions of procedural and jurisdictional due
process. Initially, the Court held that certain state statutes allowing pre-
judgment attachment of property without prior notice or hearing or other
procedural safeguards to protect the property owner violated the owner's
fourteenth amendment guarantee of procedural due process.2 A more re-
cent decision invalidated a state court's assertion of jurisdiction based on
the fortuitous presence of the defendant's property within the state.3 The
Court held that jurisdictional due process required that all assertions of
state court jurisdiction, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem,4
should be governed by a minimum contacts standard.'
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnishment statute);
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sequestration statute); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin statute); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(wage garnishment statute). Because of the common development of fourteenth amendment
procedural due process principles in these cases, this development will be referred to as the
Sniadach line of cases. See text accompanying notes 41-56 infra.
3 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
The Shaffer Court defined in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, stating that:
A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in designated property. A
judgment quasi in rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated
property. The latter is of two types. In one the plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-
existing claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexist-
ence of similar interests of particular persons. In the other the plaintiff seeks to
apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a
claim against him. (citation omitted)
Id. at 199 n.17. An in personam judgment may be rendered where the jurisdiction of the court
which renders it is based on the court's power over the parties upon and in favor of whom
the judgment is issued. An in personam judgment imposes a personal liability or obligation
upon one or more parties. RESTATMENT OF JUDGMErrs § 34 (1942).
5 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207, 212. The minimum contacts standard was first
adopted in an action asserting in personam jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The International Shoe Court held that a state court could subject
a defendant to a personal judgment if that defendant had sufficient contacts with the jurisdic-
tion so that an assertion of personal jurisdiction would not offend modern notions of fair play
and substantial justice. 326 U.S. at 320. In Shaffer, a Delaware court attempted to assert
jurisdiction over a defendant who, although he lacked the minimum contacts necessary for a
valid assertion of in personam jurisdiction, had property in the state. See text accompanying
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Although none of the Court's recent decisions were decided in a com-
mercial maritime context, the procedures invalidated are sufficiently anal-
ogous to the admiralty procedures of maritime attachment' and in rem
arrest7 of vessels to raise doubts about the constitutional validity of these
ancient admiralty procedures The two-pronged inquiry required to deter-
notes 60-74 infra. The Shaffer Court invalidated the assertion of jurisdiction emphasizing that
absent adequate contacts among the forum, the defendant, and the litigation, any assertion
of jurisdiction would violate modern notions of fair play. 433 U.S. at 208-09. For a discussion
of modern bases of minimum contacts jurisdiction, see von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction
to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966) [hereinafter cited as von
Mehren & Trautman].
6 Maritime attachment, the admiralty equivalent of foreign attachment, serves to com-
pel a defendant's appearance and to secure a fund for satisfaction of a successful suit. E.g.,
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 693 (1950).
The sequestration statute, DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974), application of which was invalida-
ted in Shaffer, is analogous to maritime attachment in that, as the equity counterpart of
foreign attachment, 433 U.S. at 194 n.10; see text accompanying notes 60-63 infra, the Dela-
ware sequestration procedure was also designed to compel the personal appearance of a
nonresident defendant, Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 117 A.2d 365, 366 (Del. 1955); see
Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 749
(1973). The Sniadach-line of cases considered the constitutionality of summary prejudgment
attachment and garnishment statutes designed to secure funds for satisfaction of any poten-
tial judgment awarded to the plaintiff. See text accompanying notes 41-56 infra. The statutes
invalidated in the Sniadach line of cases are analogous to maritime attachment procedure
because they were summary and ex parte in nature. See FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. B & E;
text accompanying notes 9-13 infra.
I In rem arrest, as codified in FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. C & E, is comparable with the
statutes held unconstitutional in the Sniadach line of cases. The arrest procedure is ex parte,
summary in nature, requires no judicial review before issuance of the writ, and contains no
provisions for an immediate postseizure hearing. See McCreary, Going For The Jugular Vein:
Arrests and Attachments in Admiralty, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 24 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
McCreary]. For a discussion of the procedure of Fed. R. Civ. P. Adm., Supp. C, see text
accompanying notes 25-43 infra.
The admiralty in rem proceeding is related to the jurisdictional issue confronted in
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), because jurisdiction for an admiralty in rem proceed-
ing is based solely on the presence of the property within the jurisdiction. Ex Parte Republic
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943); Dow Chemical Co. v. Barge UM-23B, 424 F.2d 307, 311
(5th Cir. 1970); see Rogers, Enforcement of Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 47 TUL. L. REV.
767, 768 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rogers]. Shaffer held that assertions of jurisdiction
based solely on the presence of property, without regard to contacts among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation, were invalid. 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977); see text accompanying
notes 60-72 infra.
Three litigants have unsuccessfully attacked the procedures of maritime attachment
and in rem arrest as violating the procedural due process mandates found in the Sniadach
line of cases. Amstar Corp. v. MN Alexandros T., 431 F. Supp. 328, 333-34 (D. Md. 1977)
(actual notice to vessel owner and availability of immediate postseizure hearing, due to local
court rules, afforded ship owner due process rights); Central Soya Co. v. Cox Towing Corp.,
417 F. Supp. 658, 662-64 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (court held that the Sniadach line of cases
generally required notice or hearing prior to seizure, but determined that need to seize a vessel
to establish in rem liability was an extraordinary circumstance justifying seizure without
prior hearing); Techem Chem. Co. v. M/T Choyo Maru, 416 F. Supp. 960, 967-70 (D. Md.
1976) (court noted that the Sniadach line of cases required hearing prior to attachment but
indicated that maritime in rem seizure was an extraordinary situation justifying seizure
without prior notice or hearing).
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mine the validity of these procedures is, first, whether the summary, ex
parte nature of in rem seizure and maritime attachment acts to deprive
property owners of their property without according them due process
rights and, second, whether these maritime procedures, which assert juris-
diction over persons with interests in the seized property, violate modern
constitutional standards of jurisdictional due process.
The procedure of maritime attachment as codified in Supplemental
Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure9 serves the dual function of
vesting the court with jurisdiction over the defendant's property to compel
his appearance and of securing a fund for satisfaction of the plaintiffs
claim.'0 A plaintiff with a personal claim against a defendant who is not
present in the district" may have any of the defendant's property at-
tached.'2 The defendant must either appear and defend against the claim
or default and lose the property attached.'3 Invocation of maritime attach-
ment is summary and ex parte." The plaintiff initiates the maritime at-
The President of the Maritime Law Association of the United States has argued that the
Sniadach line of cases and Shaffer should not be literally applied to the admiralty procedures
of maritime attachment and in rem arrest because the decisions were not made in a commer-
cial maritime context and the Court, therefore, never considered the effects the holdings
might have on admiralty practice. Letter from David R. Owen to Members of the Maritime
Law Association of the United States (August 1, 1977) (on file WASH. & LEE L. REv.).
9 FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. B allows both attachment of the defendant's property and
garnishment of credits and effects of the defendant in the possession of third persons. Thus,
intangibles such as bank accounts and insurance proceeds may be garnished. Cf. Federazione
Italiana, D.C.A. v. Mandask Compania D. V., 158 F. Supp. 107, 108, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(garnishment of hull insurance proceeds available but failed because defendant could be
"found" within the district, see text accompanying notes 11-12 infra).
1 E.g., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684,
693 (1950); Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 489 (1825).
" FED. R. Civ. P. AnM., Supp. B; see note 16 infra.
,2 Only property within the territorial limits of the district may be attached. FED. R. Crv.
P. AUM., Supp. E(3)(a). In attaching intangibles such as debts, courts in the past have
generally regarded the location of the garnishee to be determinative of the situs of the intangi-
ble. See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905); Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits
Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241, 255 (1939); von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 5, at 1157.
,1 Attachment of a nonresident's property coerces an appearance by threatening the sale
of the nonresident's property and application of the proceeds to satisfy the claim that has
been brought against him. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe,
S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950); Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 487-89 (1825); Carring-
ton, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L. REv. 303, 305 (1962). When
maritime attachment is used in conjunction with an in personam claim, damages awarded
cannot exceed the value of the property attached. See McCreary, supra note 7, at 20. The
defendant may enter a restricted appearance, submitting to the jurisdiction of the court for
the sole purpose of defending against the claim which was initiated by the attachment or
arrest. FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. E(8). By entering a restricted appearance a defendant or
vessel owner can protect his property interests without subjecting himself to personal service
in the jurisdiction. See Logue Stevedoring Corp. v. The Dalzellance, 198 F.2d 369, 372 (2d
Cir. 1952).
" For a discussion of the procedure of maritime attachment, see McCreary, supra note
7. A judicial proceeding is ex parte when it is conducted at the instance and for the benefit
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tachment procedure by including in his complaint a request that the defen-
dant's property be attached'5 and by submitting an affidavit alleging that
the defendant cannot be found within the district.'8 Upon receipt of these
documents, Supplemental Rule B directs the clerk to issue a summons and
process of attachment'7 and instructs the marshal to attach the defen-
dant's assets.'" The defendant generally will not receive notice of the at-
tachment until he is served with the complaint by mail'" and he is not able
to regain possession of his property until security sufficient to equal the
amount of the plaintiffs claim is posted or arrangements for the release of
the property are made through negotiations with the plaintiff."0
Like maritime attachment, in rem seizure of a vessel2' under Supple-
of one party only and without notice to or contestation by any person adversely interested.
Van Allen v. Superior Ct., 37 Cal. App. 696, 174 P. 672 (1918); Stella v. Mosele, 299 Ill. App.
53, 19 N.E. 2d 433 (1939). The term summary, used in connection with legal proceedings,
means a short, concise, and immediate proceeding. Vance v. Noel, 143 La. 477, 78 So. 741
(1918).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. B(1). The prayer for process to attach is contained in a
verified complaint. Id.
" Id. The affidavit may be signed by the plaintiff or his attorney and the allegation that
the defendant cannot be found within the district may be based on the affiant's own knowl-
edge or his information and belief. Id. Supplemental Rule B does not define the phrase "found
within the district." The Advisory Committee notes indicate that unless a defendant may be
personally served within the district, his property will be subject to maritime attachment.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 39 F.R.D. 69, 148 (1966). FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(d)(7) & (e) have expanded the jurisdictional reaches of the federal district courts by
authorizing personal service of absent defendants in the manner prescribed by long-arm
statutes of the state in which the court is located. The Advisory Committee, however, appar-
ently did not intend to limit the use of maritime attachment to cases where personal jurisdic-
tion could not be obtained by any method. On the contrary, the Committee intended to
expand the use of maritime attachment by allowing attachment whenever the defendant
could not be personally served with the summons and complaint within the district. See
PROPOSED ADMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 39 F.R.D. 69, 148 (1966); McCreary,
supra note 7, at 34-39.
'7 FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. B(1).
" FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., SupP. E(4)(a). When it appears from the face of the documents
that the defendant cannot be found within the district, the marshal is required to execute
the process of maritime attachment. Id.
1g FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. B(2) provides that no default judgment may be entered
unless the plaintiff has given notice of the action to the defendant by mail, served the
defendant in a manner prescribed by FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) or (i), or has been unable to give
notice to the defendant despite diligent effort. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) authorizes service in
accordance with the long-arm statutes of the state in which the federal district court is located
while FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) prescribes procedures for service upon inhabitants of foreign coun-
tries. The Advisory Committee's view of the need for notice to the defendant is reflected by
its assertion that when garnishment is accomplished, no notice to the defendant is required
by due process because the garnishee, under the doctrine of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905), would be required to notify the defendant that his credits had been garnished or be
deprived of the right to plead the garishment judgment as a defense in a later action against
him by the defendant. 5 A. KNAUTH & C. KNAUTH, BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 248 (rev. 6th ed.
1974).
o FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., SUPP. E(5)(a), (b), & (c).
21 The right to seize a vessel or any other maritime property in rem under FED. R. Civ.
P. ADM., Supp. R. C is based on the existence of a maritime lien against the vessel or property.
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mental Rule C22 is a summary ex parte procedure. 2n When the plaintiff files
a verified complaint describing the property which is the subject of the
action, 2 the clerk is directed to issue a warrant for the arrest of the vessel.2
5
Notice to any interested party is required only if the release of the vessel
has not been arranged within ten days 6 in which case notice by publication
in the district is required.2 As with maritime attachment, the property
cannot be released until arrangements for adequate security are made.
28
The primary difference between maritime attachment and in rem sei-
zure is the extent of jurisdictional power over seized property each proce-
dure vests in the court. Maritime attachment is limited to use in conjunc-
tion with an in personam claim."9 Maritime attachment of the defendant's
property vests the court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs
claim " against the defendant and allows the court to dispose of the prop-
erty in accordance with its decision. 3' Thus a judgment adverse to the
defendant and sale of his property pursuant to an action initiated by
maritime attachment extinguishes only the defendant's interests in the
property.32 In contrast, the right to seize a vessel pursuant to an in rem
See notes 33 & 34 infra. A maritime lienor may also seize cargo, see, e.g., 4,885 Bags of
Linseed, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 108 (1861), and freight monies, see, e.g., United States v. Freights
of S.S. Mount Shasta, 274 U.S. 466 (1927). See McCreary, supra note 7, at 27. For simplicity,
the term "seizure of a vessel" will be used to indicate all property seizable by virtue of the
existence of a maritime lien.
22 FED. R. Crv. P. ADM., Supp. C.
2 See note 14 supra.
24 FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. C(2). The complaint must also state that the property to
be seized is in the district or is expected to be in the district during the pendency of the action.
Id.
, FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. R. C(3).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., SUPP. R. C(4).
vId.
2 If the parties cannot agree on the value of a bond to release the property seized, the
court is authorized to fix bond for the release of the property. FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., SUPP.
E(5).
2See FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. B(1).
3 See Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473 (1825). There is no requirement that
the property attached have any relationship to the plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Swift & Co.
Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684 (1950) (vessel attached
owned by same company owning vessel which damaged plaintiffs cargo); Federazione Ital-
iana, D.C.A. v. Mandask Compania D.V., 158 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (bank account
attached in a suit for nondelivery of cargo).
22 Although a court has no jurisdiction over a person against whom a personal claim is
asserted, the court may, by proper service of process, acquire jurisdiction to apply to the
satisfaction of the personal claim, interests in property belonging to the person against whom
the claim is asserted which is subject to the jurisdiction of the court. See Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714 (1877); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENrS § 34 (1942).
1" In a proceeding begun by attachment or garnishment, the judgment is only conclusive
as to the defendant's interests in the thing attached or in the obligation of the garnishee to
the defendant. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 76 (1942). Because a purchaser of attached
property at a judicial sale will take only the defendant's interest and will remain subject to
all other claims on the property, the prudent buyer is less likety to purchase the property at
its market value.
1978]
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action depends on the existence of a maritime lien" against the vessel.3 4
Seizure of the vessel, which initiates the in rem action to enforce the
maritime lien, gives the court power to adjudicate the validity of the lien.3
The court is vested with jurisdiction to issue a binding judgment affecting
the interests of all persons in the property36 whether or not they were
parties to the action.3 7 Thus, the judicial sale of a vessel pursuant to an in
rem decree passes good title to the purchaser 38 free from all other interests
in the property.39 Therefore, maritime attachment and in rem seizure are
clearly differentiated by the extent of jurisdictional power they vest in the
court. While maritime attachment allows a court to adjudicate a personal
claim against an absent defendant and affect his interests in the attached
property accordingly, an in rem seizure gives a court the power to adjudi-
cate all interests in the seized property and pass good title to the property
3 FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. C(1)(a); see The Rock Island Bridge, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
213, 215 (1867). Maritime liens arise as a result of numerous maritime occurrences including
a seamen's claims for wages, see, e.g., The Merchant, 17 F. Cas. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No.
9,434), salvage claims, see, e.g., The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1880), tort claims, see, e.g., North
Am. Dredging Co. v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 185 F. 698 (9th Cir. 1911), and claims in favor of
a cargo owner for the safe transport of his goods, see, e.g., The Maggie Hammond, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 435 (1869). See generally G. PRIcE, THE LAW OF MARITIME LIENS (1940); Harmon,
Discharge and Waiver of Maritime Liens, 47 TuL. L. REv. 786 (1973); Toy, Introduction to
the Law of Maritime Liens, 47 TUL. L. REv. 559, 560 (1973).
m FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., SupP. C.
3 See The Gazelle, 10 F. Cas. 127 (D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,289); Rogers, supra note 8, at
768. The continued custody of the property by the appellate court is necessary for an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Martin v. The Bud, 172 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1949). But see
Inland Credit Corp. v. M/T Bow Egret, 556 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1977) (fact that funds from in
rem sale were released from court's custody did not deprive court of continued jurisdiction).
1 An in rem judgment in admiralty is binding on the entire world. See, e.g., Point
Landing, Inc. v. Alabama Dry Dock & Ship Bldg. Co., 261 F.2d 861, 866 (5th Cir. 1958); The
Trenton, 4 F. 657 (E.D.Mich. 1880). See generally Rogers, supra note 7, at 768.
3 Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795); Loud v. United States, 286 F. 56, 60
(6th Cir. 1923); United States v. Steel Tank Barge H 1651, 272 F. Supp. 658, 662 (E.D. La.
1967); Morrisey v. S.S. A. & J Faith, 238 F. Supp. 877, 879 (N.D. Ohio 1964). The
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS states:
A valid judgment in rem cannot be collaterally attacked. It is in accordance with
public policy that when the rights have once been finally determined, the question
of the existence of the rights cannot be again litigated. It is in the interest of the
successful party and of the public that the matter should be finally determined in
the proceeding in which it is decided. . . . [lit is immaterial whether the persons
whose rights in the thing were affected did or did not avail themselves of an oppor-
tunity to object to the judgment. It is immaterial that a person whose rights in the
thing were affected did not have actual knowledge of the proceeding, provided that
a proper method of notification was employed.
RESTATEhENT OF JUDGMENTS § 2, comment a (1942).
3 See, e.g., Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915). The rights
of a purchaser of a vessel pursuant to an in rem decree have long been recognized in admi-
ralty. "That the sale of a vessel, made pursuant to the decree of a foreign court of admiralty,
will be held valid in every other country, and will vest a clear and indefeasible title in the
purchaser, is entirely settled, both in England and in America." The Trenton, 4 F. 657, 659
(E.D. Mich. 1880).
See, e.g., Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638, 647 (1900).
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at a judicial sale enforcing the maritime lien. Procedurally, however, mari-
time attachment and in rem seizure are similar because both are initiated
prior to judgment and are summary and ex parte in nature."'
Prior to 1969, summary prejudgment creditor remedies, similar to mari-
time attachment and in rem seizure, had never been successfully chal-
lenged on procedural due process grounds. In Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.,' however, the Supreme Court sustained a constitutional challenge
to the summary ex parte nature of a prejudgment garnishment statute.42
The Sniadach Court held that fourteenth amendment procedural due pro-
cess required notice or an opportuniity for a hearing prior to the garnish-
ment of a defendant's wages to safeguard against wrongful seizure.43
Fuentes v. Shevin44 broadened the scope of Sniadach. Invalidating two
summary, ex parte prejudgment replevin statutes,45 the Fuentes Court
held that due process guaranteed a defendant an opportunity for a hearing
prior to any deprivation of property.46 The Court reasoned that statutory
provisions requiring the plaintiff to post bond before seizure and the lim-
ited duration of the seizure did not lessen the need for an opportunity for
a hearing prior to any deprivation, to protect the defendant against wrong-
, See McCreary, supra note 7, at 19-21; text accompanying notes 9-28 supra.
41 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
12 In Sniadach, the Supreme Court invalidated Wisconsin's wage garnishment proce-
dure. The procedure allowed a plaintiff, by simply requesting a summons from the court
clerk, to prevent payment of the defendant's wages. Id. at 338.
1 The Sniadach Court reasoned that the right to be heard is of little worth unless a party
is informed of the proceeding against him, id. at 339, and that grave injustices occur where
prejudgment garnishment is allowed without prior hearing, id. at 340. See Hansford,
Procedural Due Process in the Debtor-Creditor Relationship: The Impact of Di-Chem, 9 GA.
L. REV. 589 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hansford]; Comment, Foreign Attachment After
Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 342 (1973); 8 AKRON L. REV. 360 (1975). Lower
courts have varied in their interpretation of the Sniadach opinion. Compare, e.g., Black
Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971) (notice or hearing before
prejudgment attachment of real property is not required) and American Olean Tile Co. v.
Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970) (notice or hearing before garnishment of
corporate checking account not required) with Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.
1972) rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973)
(summary repossession and sale violated Sniadach mandates) and Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (replevin statute allowing seizure without
hearing or notice unconstitutional).
4 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
41 The statutes involved in Fuentes allowed a plaintiff, on ex parte application to the
court clerk, to seize property purchased by the defendant under a conditional sales contract.
The Court emphasized that the right to a hearing was designed to protect the individual
against arbitrary encroachment and minimize mistaken deprivations of property. Id. at 81.
The Fuentes Court reasoned that the opportunity for a hearing had to be provided at a time
when the deprivation could still be prevented in order for such opportunity to be meaningful,
id. at 81, and thus an individual must be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
- deprived of his property. Id. at 82.
' In holding that the Constitution required notice and opportunity for a hearing prior
to any deprivation of property, the Fuentes Court refused to draw a distinction between
various types of property. Id. at 88-90; see Hansford, supra note 43, at 593; note 45 supra.
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ful replevin. 7 The Supreme Court qualified the sweeping holding of
Fuentes in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.4" There, the Court upheld a seques-
tration statute which allowed summary, ex parte seizure of property.49 The
Mitchell Court reasoned that a prior hearing was not required when the
procedural safeguards in the statute sufficiently minimized the possibility
of mistaken deprivation. 0 Subsequently, the Court in North Georgia Fin-
ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.' continued the apparent retreat from the
Fuentes requirement that all deprivations of property be preceded by no-
tice and a hearing."2
The Di-Chem decision nominally reaffirmed Fuentes,3 but the Court
cited Fuentes for the general proposition that deprivations of property
violated the fourteenth amendment "[b]ecause the official seizures had
been carried out without notice and without opportunity for a hearing or
other safeguard against mistaken repossession."'" Significantly, the Court
failed to mention a preseizure hearing requirement. The ambiguity of the
Di-Chem opinion concerning the constitutional necessity of a hearing prior
to attachment indicated a retreat from the full thrust of Fuentes.-, The
" The requirement that the plaintiff post bond before seizure was not considered a viable
substitute for a prior hearing as a preventative measure against wrongful or mistaken repos-
session. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 83; see note 46 supra.
' 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
" The Louisiana sequestration procedure had a number of safeguards to protect the
property owner against wrongful seizure. To obtain the writ, a plaintiff filed an affidavit
setting forth specific facts surrounding the claim and posted a bond to indemnify the defen-
dant in the event of wrongful seizure. The debtor had a right to an immediate postseizure
hearing in which the plaintiff had the burden of justifying the continued deprivation of
property. The writ also was issued by a judge. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. arts. 282, 283, 325,
2373, 3501, 3504, 3506-8, 3510, 3571, 3574, & 3576 (West 1960).
1 416 U.S. at 605.
" 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
The Georgia garnishment statute invalidated by the Di-Chem Court allowed issuance
of a writ based on an affidavit containing only conclusory allegations. The statute also failed
to provide for any postseizure hearing and did not provide for judicial intervention in the
issuance of the writ. Id. at 607. The Court reasoned that the Georgia statute was unconstitu-
tional because it had the faults of the statutes invalidated in Fuentes and lacked the proce-
dural safeguards of the Louisiana sequestration statute upteld in Mitchell. Id. at 606-07; see
notes 46 & 49 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 45-57 supra.
m North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. at 606.
1 The assertion that the Di-Chem Court retreated from the strict Fuentes requirement
of an opportunity for hearing prior to seizure is supported by the reasoning of the Court. If
prior hearing were an absolute requirement, the Court could have invalidated the procedure
on that basis alone. Instead, the Court considered the total effect of the procedural safeguards
provided in the statute. Id. at 606-08. By extension of the Court's analysis, the statute would
have been upheld even though it failed to provide preseizure notice or hearing if it had
contained the procedural safeguards found in Mitchell. See Hansford, supra note 43, at 605-
07; Kay & Lubin, Making Sense of the Prejudgment Seizure Cases, 64 Ky. L.J. 705, 712-17,
717-18 nn. 53 & 54 (1954); Note, Foreign Attachment Power Constrained-An End to Quasi
In Rem Jurisdiction?, 31 MiAMi L. Rzv. 419, 435 (1977). See generally Note, Specifying the
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88
HAuv. L. Rzv. 1510 (1975).
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language of Di-Chem implied that a hearing prior to seizure is not constitu-
tionally required if other procedural safeguards provide sufficient protec-
tion against wrongful seizure.
The Sniadach line of cases concerned the constitutional requirements
of procedural due process in the context of domestic attachments for secu-
rity purposes. 5 None of these decisions dealt with foreign attachment stat-
utes. Foreign attachment, like domestic attachment, secures a fund for
satisfaction of a favorable judgment; however, the procedure is also used
to obtain jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.58 Thus, constitutional
analysis of a foreign attachment statute involves two issues. First, since
foreign attachment statutes, like domestic attachment statutes, are sum-
mary and ex parte in nature they must be analyzed in terms of the proce-
dural due process mandates of the Sniadach line of cases. 9 Second, be-
cause foreign attachment is also a means of exerting jurisdiction, it must
not exceed the limits of jurisdictional due process.
The Supreme Court recently considered a jurisdictional and procedural
due process attack on a state's foreign attachment statutes deciding the
case on jurisdictional grounds. In Shaffer v. Heitner,0 the plaintiff, in a
stockholder's derivative action against Greyhound Corporation and
twenty-eight of its directors, sequestered"1 the stock holdings 2 of twenty-
one of the directors in order to compel their general appearance.63 The
Court invalidated Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction and held that all
assertions of jurisdiction by a state court must be evaluated according to
419 U.S. at 606.
Each of the Sniadach line of cases presented a creditor-debtor relationship in which
the creditor, seeking to insure preservation of property for the satisfaction of a judgment in
his favor, sought to bring property in the possession of the debtor into the custody of the court
by means of state prejudgment seizure remedies. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. at 603-04; Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 601; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
at 70-72; Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 337-38.
-, Foreign attachment is used where the defendant is a nonresident or beyond the terri-
torial limits of the jurisdiction. His goods, realty, or other property within the jurisdiction
are attached. Attachment of his property will either compel him to appear or allow the court
to dispose of the property attached. See, e.g., Bray v. McClury, 55 Mo. 128 (1874); Megee v.
Beirne, 39 Pa. 50 (1861); DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974); note 14 supra.
51 See text accompanying notes 41-56 supra.
433 U.S. 186 (1977).
'a DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974). The sole purpose of Delaware's sequestration statute
is to compel the appearance of a nonresident. Hughes Tool Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc.,
290 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1972). Sequestration in Delaware is analogous to foreign attachment
at law. Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955).
62 While the stock certificates were not physically located in Delaware and, therefore,
could not be attached, a Delaware statute provides that the situs of the stock of Delaware
corporations is regarded as being in Delaware for purposes of attachment, garnishment, and
jurisdiction of all courts in the state. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974).
13 If the defendant appears in Delaware to defend the claim initiated by the sequestration
procedure, his liability is not limited to the value of the property seized. Sands v. Lefcourt
Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365, 367 (1955). If the defendant does not appear to
defend on the merits, any judgment entered is effective only to the extent of thevalue of the
property seized. Cantor v. Sachs, 18 Del. Ch. 359, 162 A. 73 (1932).
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the minimum contacts standard previously confined to assertions of per-
sonal jurisdiction." The Shaffer Court indicated that this holding would
have the greatest effect in cases where the property, which served as the
basis for jurisdiction, was unrelated to the controversy. 5 The Court held
that, while the presence of property in a state might suggest other contacts
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, the presence of prop-
erty alone would no longer necessarily support jurisdiction.6 Noting that
the express purpose of the Delaware sequestration statute was to compel
the defendant to enter a general appearance," the Court stated that where
a direct assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate
constitutional standards of fair play and substantial justice, an indirect
assertion of jurisdiction, by exercising judicial power over his property,
would also violate those standards.68
The jurisdictional scheme adopted in Shaffer does not expressly elimi-
nate attachment as a means of acquiring jurisdiction. Shaffer does require,
however, that the validity of a court's jurisdiction to adj.dicate a contro-
versy be based on an inquiry into the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation and a consequent determination that ajudica-
tion in that forum is fair.69 The Shaffer Court indicated that where the
controversy concerns rights of the property itself, the new analysis would
not generally affect present practice." The most significant impact of
433 U.S. at 212-17. The Shaffer Court reasoned that an assertion of jurisdiction over
property was simply another way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in
that property. Id. at 2581-82; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, introduc-
tory note (1971). Therefore, the Court concluded that to justify an assertion of jurisdiction
over a person's property, the basis for the assertion should be sufficient to justify exercising
jurisdiction over the interests of the person in the property. The constitutional standard for
assertion of jurisdiction over the interests of a person is the minimum contacts standard of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
at 207. See generally Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court Establishes a Uniform
Approach to State Court Jurisdiction, 35 WASH. & LE- L. REv. 131 (1978).
. 1 433 U.S. at 208-09. The Shaffer Court cited Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) as an
example of the type of quasi in rem action that would be affected by the decision. 433 U.S.
at 208, 212 n.39. In Harris, Epstein, a Maryland resident, had a debt claim against Balk, a
North Carolina resident. When Harris, who owed Balk money, visited Maryland, Epstein
garnished Harris' debt and proceeded to litigate his claim against Balk. The Harris Court
held that the garnishment of the debt gave the state court the power to adjudicate Epstein's
claims against Balk. 198 U.S. at 217.
433 U.S. at 208-09.
' Id. at 209.
* Id.; see note 64 supra.
11 Evaluation of the fairness or reasonableness of assertions of state court jurisdiction is
made according to the standards set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). The International Shoe fairness test is based on a determination of whether the
quality and nature of the defendant's contact with or activity in the forum is such that an
assertion of jurisdiction comports with the fair and orderly administration of the laws. Id. at
319. Thus, the minimum contacts standard is not quantitative but qualitative and its appli-
cation can lead to considerable uncertainty. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 211.
m 433 U.S. at 207-09. By way of example, the Shaffer Court noted that where claims to
the property itself were the source of controversy, it would be unusual for the state where the
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Shaffer will be realized in cases where the property attached is unrelated
to the cause of action. 71 In such instances, attachment should be quashed
if the defendant lacks other contacts with the forum sufficient to sustain
an assertion of jurisdiction under the minimum contacts standard.
2
Shaffer does not invalidate prejudgment attachment of property unrelated
to the cause of action for purposes of security.3 If a dissolution or dissipa-
tion of assets to satisfy a judgment becomes probable, a plaintiff may
petition any forum to exercise judicial power over property within its terri-
torial jurisdiction for the limited purpose of creating a security fund to
satisfy a judgment being sought in another forum.74
As both a creditor security remedy and a jurisdictional device, mari-
time attachment, like other foreign attachment statutes, must adhere to
the constitutional requirements of both procedural and jurisdictional due
process. The constitutionality of assertions of jurisdiction based on the
presence of property is controlled by Shaffer. While the Shaffer Court did
not discuss the effect of its decision on maritime procedures,75 the mini-
mum contacts analysis advanced by the Court logically cannot be limited
to land law. The Shaffer reasoning was broad in that the Court recognized
an assertion of jurisdiction over a thing was actually an assertion of juris-
diction over the interests of persons in that thing.78 Therefore, the mini-
mum contacts standard governing jurisdiction over persons should govern
all assertions of jurisdiction.7 Maritime attachment of a defendant's prop-
erty, like the sequestration procedure in Shaffer, often is used by a plaintiff
to establish jurisdiction to litigate a personal claim against an absent
defendant. 8 Thus, maritime attachment, by asserting judicial power over
property is located to lack jurisdiction. The Court cited a state's strong interest in assuring
the marketability of land and the likelihood that important records and witnesses would be
located in the state as policy reasons for a state's continued need to adjudicate rights to
property within its boundaries. Id.
7' Id., see note 65 supra.
See 433 U.S. at 209.
The Shaffer Court asserted that, under the minimum contacts analysis, a wrongdoer
would not be able to avoid his obligations by moving his assets to a jurisdiction where he was
not subject to an in personam suit. Any state where the property was located would have the
power to attach the property, in conformance with Sniadach procedures, to create a fund to
satisfy a claim against the owner being litigated in a forum where minimum contacts existed.
433 U.S. at 210. Further, the Shaffer Court noted that the full faith and credit clause would
allow enforcement in any sister state of a judgment obtained in a minimum contacts forum.
Id.
74 Id. Commentators have stated that application of the minimum contacts standard to
all assertions of jurisdiction would eliminate actions like Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905),
see note 63 supra, and leave a state, having no relation to a defendant or controversy, with
the limited jurisdictional power to attach the defendant's assets within the state to protect
them against dissipation and concealment while the controversy was being litigated in an
appropriate forum. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv.
241, 282. [hereinafter cited as Hazard]; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 5, at 1178.
11 See note 8 supra.
19 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207; see text accompanying notes 60-74 supra.
7 433 U.S. at 207; see note 65 supra.
71 See, e.g., Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S.
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attached property, is actually asserting jurisdiction over the defendant's
interests in the attached property. Similarly, in rem seizure acts to vest a
court with jurisdiction to adjudicate the maritime lien interests of all per-
sons in the seized vessel."
Since maritime attachment and in rem seizure are used to assert juris-
diction over the interests of persons in seized property, application of the
minimum contacts standard appears mandatory. The breadth of the
theory underlying the minimum contacts standard, that notions of fair-
ness, reasonableness, and justice govern all assertions of jurisdiction,80 also
indicates that the standard should not be limited to a land context but
should apply equally to maritime assertions of jurisdiction.' Finally, the
fact that the maritime jurisdictional devices of maritime attachment and
in rem seizure function in an international commercial context should not
prevent the application of the minimum contacts standard to these proce-
dures. A system of jurisdiction based on minimum contacts can be applied
in an international as well as a federal context.1
2
Under a minimum contacts analysis, maritime attachment of property
will no longer confer jurisdiction over a defendant's interests in property
absent sufficient contacts among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion. 3 Thus, a maritime plaintiff should not be able to assert jurisdiction
over an absent defendant's property and litigate a personal claim against
the defendant by attaching his property within the district unless the
684, 693 (1950); Manro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 489 (1825).
See text accompanying notes 33-40 supra.
o See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 24 & 56 (1971); note 69 supra.
1, That all assertions of jurisdiction should be reasonable was the basic contention of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See text accompanying notes 60-74 supra. The
authors of the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS noted the inconsistency between notions of
reasonableness and certain quasi in rem actions:
A state may exercise judicial jurisdiction to affect interests in a chattel situated
within its territory .... Nevertheless, as applied in situations where the chattel
is situated in a state which has no other relation to the parties or to the occurrence
in question, the rule might be thought inconsistent with the basic principle of
reasonableness which underlies the field of judicial jurisdiction ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 60, comment a (1971).
11 See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 5, at 1121. "No fundamental distinction
needs to be drawn between jurisdictional problems raised by litigation involving international
elements arising in an American court, state or federal, and those raised by litigation in which
the nonlocal elements are connected with sister states." Id. at 1122. While theoretically a
minimum contacts system of jurisdiction is applicable in an international context, the diffi-
culty and expense of enforcing a judgment in a foreign country justify summary procedures
designed to secure a fund for satisfaction of a favorable judgment. Generally, a valid judg-
ment rendered by a foreign nation after a fair trial will be recognized in the United States.
See, e.g., Cherun v. Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292, 298 (D. D.C. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971). The enforcing court can, however, inquire into the proce-
dures and jurisdictional power of the rendering court. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 92 (1971). See generally von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudica-
tions: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601 (1968).
1 See text accompanying notes 60-74 supra.
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defendant has sufficient contacts with the jurisdiction to make the asser-
tion of jurisdiction reasonable. 4 The minimum contacts analysis will not
influence cases where attachment is accomplished in a jurisdiction where
the controversy arose 5 or where the defendant engages in extensive and
continuous activities" because these are generally sufficient contacts to
sustain jurisdiction." Where property is attached in a jurisdiction having
no substantial relation to the defendant or the controversy, however, adju-
dication on the merits would generally violate jurisdictional due process. 8
While application of the minimum contacts standard to maritime at-
tachment results in significant change where property is attached in a
jurisdiction lacking contacts with the controversy and the litigants," the
nature and purpose of admiralty's in rem action precludes significant
change of maritime in rem jurisdictional theory. Unlike maritime attach-
ment which serves as the jurisdictional basis of an in personam claim
leading to a judgment affecting the interests of only one person in the
attached property," enforcement of a maritime lien against a vessel in an
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 207-12; text accompanying notes 64-74 supra.
Courts have increasingly recognized that due process allows an assertion of jurisdiction
over a nonresident based on a single contact with the jurisdiction which gave rise to the
controversy to be litigated. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Page Supp. 1977). The
Supreme Court has recognized that isolated transactions which give rise to the cause of action
are sufficient bases of an exercise of jurisdiction. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957). In a maritime context, a single transaction unrelated to the cause of action
has been recognized as a valid basis of personal jurisdiction. Mackensworth v. American
Trading Transp. Co., 367 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1973). Nonresident water-craft statutes,
see, e.g., Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 1547.36 (Page Supp. 1977), which base jurisdiction on a
single transaction in the state's waters have been uniformly upheld under minimum contacts
standards. See, e.g., S.S. Philippine Jose Abad Santos v. Bannister, 335 F.2d 595 (5th Cir.
1964); Valkenburg K.-G. v. S.S. Henry Denny, 295 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1961). Therefore, an
assertion of jurisdiction by maritime attachment in a jurisdiction where the controversy arose
would be valid because the assertion would be reasonable under the minimum contacts
standard. See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 5, at 1148.
u Even if the defendant's activities in the forum did not give rise to the cause of action,
if a plaintiff can show that a nonresident defendant engaged in extensive activities within
the state, a state court may assert jurisdiction over the nonresident, without violating the
limits of jurisdictional due process, with respect to a cause of action not related to his
activities. See Del Monte Corp. v. Everett S.S. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (Page Supp. 1977); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 5
at 1147; cf. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (pre-International Shoe
case holding establishment of office in a state is submission to jurisdiction).
Hypothetically, if property having no relationship to the cause of action is attached
and the defendant receives notice of the action, a court could constitutionally assert jurisdic-
tion over the defendant, at least to the extent of the value of the attached property, if
minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. at 213-14 & n.40.
" Id. at 208-09. The Shaffer Court held that "although the presence of the defendant's
property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State,
and the litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State's jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 209.
" See text accompanying notes 83-88 supra.
"See The Morning Star, 5 F. Supp. 502, 503 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLIcr OF LAws § 66, comment b (1971); text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
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in rem action adjudicates all rights and interests in the vessel. Because
an in rem action adjudicates all interests, whether they are known or
"secret"9 2 and whether or not the owner of the interest has notice of or is a
party to the action,93 the in rem action necessarily involves an indetermi-
nate number of parties. Like other in rem actions that adjudicate the
interests of an indeterminate number of persons," jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate and foreclose all interests in property must be vested in the jurisdic-
tion where the property is located and cannot generally be based on mini-
mum contacts between all interested parties and the forum. 5 The exist-
ence of an indeterminate number of parties necessarily prevents a determi-
nation of the contacts of all interested parties with the jurisdiction. 6 Even
limiting in rem seizures to jurisdictions having minimum contacts with all
ascertainable interested parties would make seizure impracticable because
many interested parties would have no contact with the jurisdiction other
than the transient presence of the ship. Thus, in a great number of in rem
actions there would exist no forum in which all interested persons would
be amenable to jurisdiction under the minimum contacts standard.
Many of the practical advantages which the unique system of maritime
, See The Susana, 2 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1924); text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
92 The validity of a maritime lien generally does not depend on either possession or notice
to third parties through filing, Thus, the maritime lien is often called a "secret" lien. Vander-
water v. Mills, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 82 (1857). Only a preferred ship mortgage, which is statu-
tory, must be recorded. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 482 (1957).
,1 See Point Landing, Inc. v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 261 F.2d 861, 866
(5th Cir. 1958); Zimmern Coal Co. v. Coal Trading Ass'n. 30 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1929); The
Trenton, 4 F. 657, 659 (E.D. Mich: 1880); text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
" A judicial settlement of accounts of a common trust fund is binding and conclusive
on everyone having any interest in the trust whether known or not. See, e.g., Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950). A decree of registration made
after appropriate findings quiets title to property and eliminates all known and unknown
claims against the property. See, e.g., American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 63 (1911).
11 The essential purpose of an in rem proceeding is to adjudicate all known claims to the
property as well as all unknown claims. See, e.g., Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass.
71, 73, 55 N.E. 812, 813, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900). In fact, certainty against
unknown claims may be said to be the in rem action's chief purpose. Id. Since unknown
claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant, a judicial proceeding
based on the presence of the property is the only practical basis for a judgment binding
against the world. Id.; cf. Educational Studios, Inc. v. Consolidated Film Indus., 112 N.J.
Eq. 352, 164 A. 24 (1933) (court settled conflicting equitable liens of parties, some of whom
were nonresidents, concerning a chattel not permanently located in state). Commentators
suggest that it is generally unreasonable to force property owners to defend their property
interests in a chattel in a forum where the chattel is only located temporarily. However, where
the claim asserted arises from, or relates to, the use or possession of the thing against which
the action is directed, in rem jurisdiction is analogous to obtaining personal jurisdiction over
a person temporarily within a jurisdiction and thus is arguably more reasonable. Smit, The
Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 600, 614-619 (1977); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 5, at 1155-57.
,1 Unknown parties with claims could always exist and appear at a later date to contest
a judgment unless that judgment was binding against the world. Cf. Tyler v. Court of Regis-
tration, 175 Mass. 71, 74, 55 N.E. 812, 815 (1900) (sustaining constitutionality of state in rem
proceeding to quiet title).
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liens and in rem decrees provides plaintiffs would also be limited by appli-
cation of the minimum contacts standard to all suits in admiralty. A
vessel, due to the mobile nature of maritime commerce, invariably visits
places where her owners are either unknown or inaccessible. This charac-
teristic mobility underlies the practice of holding the ship itself as security
for demands against the owner. 7 Thus, even though the owner of a vessel
and his assets cannot be reached, maritime law, by impression of a mari-
time lien,9" allows an aggreived party to proceed against the ship itself for
compensation." Further, because a sale pursuant to an in rem decree pas-
ses good title to the purchaser,' a larger fund can be created by the sale
of the vessel to compensate the plaintiff. Application of the minimum
contacts standard would limit the efficacy of this procedure. If, for exam-
ple, a plaintiff was tortiously injured by defendant's ship on the high seas
the plaintiff would be forced to travel to a state or country where the
defendant had contacts and property to litigate and satisfy his claim. The
plaintiff, under minimum contacts theory, would be unable to seize the
vessel and proceed against it for satisfaction of his claim in most of the
ports in which it could be found because the presence of the ship alone
would not provide sufficient contacts with the forum to sustain jurisdic-
tion.'"I Thus assuming an inaccessible defendant, most jurisdictions would
lack the requisite contacts with the controversy or the defendant necessary
for an exercise of jurisdiction. The in rem procedure should continue to
allow the plaintiff to pursue his remedy wherever the ship may be found.,"
While in rem jurisdiction must continue to be based upon the presence
of the ship within the jurisdiction, exercise of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens °3 could substantially mitigate the inconvenience caused by
17 See Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 8-10
(1920); United States v. The Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233-35 (1844); The St. Jago
de Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409, 415-17 (1824); 2 . HALL & A. SANN, BENEDIcT ON ADMmALTY
§ 21 (rev. 7th ed. 1975).
9 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
110 See note 38 supra.
101 Minimum contacts theory is based on the relationship among the forum, the contro-
versy, and the defendant. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra. In the case of a maritime
accident, the controversy concerns the relative liabilities of the parties not ownership of the
property, although determination in favor of the plaintiff in an in rem action would give the
plaintiff property rights in the vessel. See text accompanying notes 60-68 supra.
0 See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
203 The doctrine of forum non conveniens presupposes at least two forums in which the
defendant is subject to jurisdiction and furnishes criteria, see note 105 infra, for a choice
between them. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947). The doctrine is based
on the discretionary power of the court. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541 (1931). The court
must decide whether interests of convenience and justice would best be served by retention
of jurisdiction. E.g., Del Monte Corp. v. Everett S.S. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 237, 242 (N.D. Cal.
1973). See generally Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steam Ships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932);
Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in Matters
of Admiralty, 35 CoRNELL L. Q. 12 (1949); Note, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv.
L. RRv. 908 (1947).
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seizure of a vessel in a forum lacking any contacts with the controversy or
the interested parties. Under this doctrine, an in rem action could be
transferred to a forum where an in personam action on the same issues is
already pending or could be dismissed based on an agreement among the
parties that the action be litigated in a more convenient forum.' 4 Applica-
tion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to mitigate the inconvenience
of litigation in a forum lacking contacts with the controversy or the chief
parties is particularly appropriate because the doctrine is based upon the
same considerations of convenience and fairness' 5 which underlie the min-
imum contacts analysis.
0 6
Although Shaffer held that a state court could not obtain jurisdiction
over a non-resident solely by means of attaching property fortuitously
present in the jurisdiction,"7 it did not limit the power of state courts to
attach property for security purposes."8 Nevertheless, the exercise of the
power to attach property prior to judgment must comply with the proce-
dural due process requirements of the Sniadach line of cases.0 9 As pres-
ently constituted, the procedures of maritime attachment and in rem sei-
zure codified in Supplemental Rules B, C, and E fail to provide the mini-
mum procedural safeguards required by procedural due process and are
therefore unconstitutional. The Sniadach line of cases requires that stat-
utes which deprive persons of property prior to judgment must provide
certain minimum procedural safeguards to protect the property owner
against wrongful seizure."10 The Supplemental Rules exhibit most of the
procedural faults contained in the statutes found unconstitutional in the
Sniadach line of cases. Rules B and C lack any mechanism to insure the
property owner is indemnified in the event of wrongful seizure."' The Rules
"I Transfer of suits between federal district courts is facilitated by 28 U.S.C. § 1404
(1970). See Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960). If a foreign country
would serve as a better forum, a court has the power to dismiss an action based on the
stipulation that the respondents should appear and file security in any action that might be
instituted against them in the foreign jurisdiction. See Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson
Steamships Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932).
110 The specific factors for determining which of two forums would better suit the inter-
ests of fairness and convenience include the personal desires of the litigants, access to sources
of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, and possi-
bility of difficulty in application of foreign law. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508
(1947); Del Monte Corp. v. Everett S.S. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 237, 242 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
'o' Compare Del Monte Corp. v. Everett S.S. Co., 402 F. Supp. 237, 243 (N.D. Cal. 1973)
with Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Ct., 71 Cal. 2d 893, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118, 458 P.2d 57,
62 (1969).
117 See text accompanying notes 60-72 supra.
,o8 See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
,"I See text accompanying notes 41-56 supra. The Shaffer Court noted that attachment
for security purposes must comply with procedural due process as outlined in the Sniadach
line of cases. 433 U.S. at 210 n.34.
11o See text accompanying notes 41-56 supra.
"' The requirement of posting bond by the plaintiff prior to seizure or attachment as-
sures the defendant a means of indemnification for costs incurred contesting meritless or
vexatious seizures and deters unwarranted actions. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
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also fail to provide a procedure whereby the property owner can promptly
contest the validity of the seizure."2 Finally, the Supplemental Rules make
no attempt to mitigate the dangers inherent in an ex parte procedure to
issue a writ such as the possibility that facts in the complaint or affidavit
are erroneous"' or the complaint itself is frivolous."'
The maritime attachment and in rem seizure rules, Supplemental
Rules B and C respectively, could be amended to provide more protection
to the property owner without impairing the effectiveness of either proce-
dure. First, both Rules should require a more specific factual showing of
the nature of the claim"' in order that an evaluation of the right to seize
or attach could be made before issuance of a warrant or a writ."6 The
affidavit"7 alleging that the defendant could "not be found within the
district" should be required to contain specific facts indicating the basis
for this conclusion."' Second, while the mobile context of the shipping
608 (1974). Presently, the court is authorized to require any party to post bond at any time
during the pendency of the action. FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. E(2)(b). Since the court does
not supervise issuance of the process to attach or seize, however, see text accompanying notes
9-28 supra, a wrongful seizure could be accomplished before the court has an opportunity to
order the posting of a bond.
"I See FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B,C, & E; cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,
610 (1974) (debtor entitled to immediate postseizure hearing). The provision for an immedi-
ate postseizure hearing was a significant factor in the Mitchell Court's decision to uphold
Louisiana's ex parte sequestration statute. Id. Lack of notice or opportunity for an early
hearing was a defect in Georgia's garnishment statute. North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. at 606. But see Amstar Corp. v. MN Alexandros T., 431 F. Supp. 328 (D. Md.
1977) (local court rule allowing a party to meet with "on duty" judge at any time mitigated
need for provision in rule allowing immediate postseizure hearing).
"I The affidavit which must accompany an in personam complaint and prayer for at-
tachment need only state that, to the best of the affiant's knowledge, the defendant cannot
be found within the district. FED. R. Civ. P. ADM., Supp. B(1); see note 16 supra; notes 117-
23 infra.
M A meaningful review of the grounds relied on for attachment is a means of protecting
against wrongful seizure. Judicial review of the application for Louisiana's sequestration writ
was commended by the Mitchell Court. 416 U.S. at 608, 617-18. Lack of judicial intervention
in issuance of Georgia's garnishment writ was one of the factors creating an unacceptable
danger of wrongful seizure of property. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. at 607.
' Georgia revised their prejudgment garnishment laws after they were invalidated in Di-
Chem. The new garnishment procedure requires enumeration of specific facts relied on to
show the existence of one of the permissible grounds for issuance of a prejudgment garnish-
ment writ. This revision is designed to correct the conclusory nature of the invalid statutes.
Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 46-202 (Harrison Supp. 1977) (enacted 1976) with GA. CODE ANN.
§ 46-101 (Harrison 1974) (superseded 1976).
"I A warrant is issued in the in rem procedure to arrest the vessel. FAD. R. Civ. P. ADM.,
SuPP. C(3). A writ of attachment is issued in a maritime attachment procedure. FED. R. Civ.
P. ADM., Supp. B(1).
II See note 16 supra.
The possibility exists that the plaintiff has not made a diligent effort to determine
whether the defendant can be found within the district and an unjustified seizure could occur
as a result. Cf. Federazione Italiana D.C. v. Mandask Compania D.V., 158 F. Supp. 107
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (facts leading to conclusion that plaintiff failed to make bona fide effort to
"locate" defendant within the district justified dissolution of attachment).
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industry makes the safeguard of a hearing prior to seizure impractical, a
provision for an immediate postseizure hearing to allow the defendant to
contest the validity of the seizure could be readily implemented." 9 Third,
prior to issuance of a writ or warrant, Rules B and C should provide for a
meaningful evaluation of the right of the plaintiff to resort to attachment
or seizure.'20 Finally, the Supplemental Rules should require that a plain-
tiff post bond before issuance of the writ or warrant to insure the defendant
compensation against wrongful seizure.' 1 Effecting these procedural
changes would make Supplemental Rules B, C, and E comport with proce-
dural due process as defined in the Sniadach line of cases without compro-
mising the effectiveness of the procedures as creditor remedies.
Due to the international, commercial, and mobile nature of the mari-
time industry, summary ex parte attachment and seizure provisions are a
necessary element of effective creditor remedies.'22 The Sniadach line of
cases do not mandate preseizure notice and opportunity for a hearing,'2
but they do require a sufficient measure of procedural safeguards to protect
the debtor against wrongful or mistaken deprivations of property.'2 4 Cur-
rently, Supplemental Rules B, C, and E do not contain sufficient safe-
guards to meet the procedural due process requirements of the Sniadach
line of cases.12 5 Maritime attachment and in rem seizure, as methods of
vesting admiralty courts with jurisdiction over an action, will, in most
cases, be unaffected by Shaffer. Maritime attachment, however, will no
longer vest a court with jurisdiction over a controversy concerning a non-
resident defendant unless minimum contacts exist among the defendant,
"I Georgia, responding to the Di-Chem decision, implemented a provision in their gar-
nishment procedure providing a method for the defendant to immediately contest the seizure
in a hearing to be scheduled no later than 10 days after the defendant's objection. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 46-206 (Harrison Supp. 1977).
10 In response to the due process mandates of the Di-Chem decision, Georgia's new
statutory prejudgment garnishment scheme provides that a judge must consider the plain-
tiff's application for garnishment before a writ is issued. See GA. CODE ANN. § 46-203 (Harri-
son Supp. 1977). Subsequent to Fuentes, Florida added provisions to their replevin procedure
requiring judicial scrutiny of applications for writs of replevin before issuance. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 78.045, 78.068 (West Supp. 1976).
,2, Mr. Justice Powell stated in Di-Chem, "In my view, procedural due process would
be satisfied where state law requires that the garnishment be preceded by the garnishor's
provision of adequate security . North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S.
at 611 (Powell, J., concurring).
22 Attachment must be executed prior to a hearing because if a ship were notified of
impending seizure it could simply leave the jurisdiction. If adequate security could not be
obtained in the United States, American plaintiffs could have difficulty enforcing United
States judgments abroad because foreign sovereigns have broad discretion in deciding
whether to enforce another sovereign's decree. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAws § 98 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATION LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 146-154 (1965).
"n See Hansford, supra note 43, at 593; text accompanying notes 42-56 supra.
124 See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
"s See text accompanying notes 110-121 supra.
[Vol. XXXV
1978] MARITIME ATTACHMENT AND ARREST
the forum, and the controversy.2" The Shaffer holding should not effect the
jurisdictional basis of in rem proceedings, which, because of their utility
in providing maritime plaintiffs with a speedy and effective means of re-
covery, should be based on the court's possession of the vessel, the value
of which will satisfy any judgment of the court.'
GREGG J. BORRI
'2 See text accompanying notes 83-88 supra.
121 See text accompanying notes 90-102 supra.
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